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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FRANK BRGOCH and 
SEYMOUR ISAACS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
vs. 
RONALD ALLEN HARRY, an 
individual; PRIVATE LEDGER 
FINANCIAL SERVICES. INC.. LINSCO 
FINANCIAL SERVICES. INC.. 
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER 
CORPORATION: and DOES 1-10 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1994) 
which grants the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over "cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court." This is a civil case decided by summary judgment in the 
district court. The appeal was originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1994), and was subsequently transferred to this Court by the supreme 
court on April 5, 1995. Therefore, jurisdiction properly lies in this Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Frank Brgoch and Seymour Isaacs present the following issues for 
review by this Court: 
Case No. 950238-CA 
Priority No. 15 
1. Did the trial court's ruling that Defendants/Appellees Private Ledger Financial 
Services, Inc., Linsco Financial Services, Inc., and Linsco/Private Ledger Corporation 
(collectively referred to as "Private Ledger") were not liable to plaintiffs violate the doctrine of 
apparent authority? 
2. Were disputed issues of material fact present which precluded summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: This case was decided on summary judgment. Summary judgment 
is appropriate only when no issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 626-27 (Utah 
1994); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). A party's entitlement to 
summary judgment is a question of law; therefore, no deference is accorded the trial court's 
resolution of legal issues. K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d at 627; Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 
855 P.2d at 235. The appellate court determines "whether the trial court erred in applying the 
governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). Finally, in reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, the appellate court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 
K&T, Inc., 888 P.2d at 624; Higgins, 855 P.2d at 233. 
The issues presented in this brief were presented to the trial court in the plaintiffs' 
response to Private Ledger's motion for summary judgment (R. 580-621) and the plaintiffs' 
memorandum in support of their motion for reconsideration and the reply memorandum. (R. 
682-701; 787-95) 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES 
Any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules relative to the disposition of this case are 
set forth either in the text of the brief or in the addenda to the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs filed their original complaint in this action against Defendants 
Harry and Private Ledger on March 17, 1992. (R. 2-8) After some initial motions, which are 
not relevant to this appeal, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint against Defendants Harry 
and Private Ledger on December 31, 1992. (R. 288-302) That complaint alleged four causes 
of action against Defendant Harry including breach of fiduciary, negligence, securities violations, 
and fraud.1 Brgoch and Isaacs also alleged that Private Ledger breached its fiduciary duty to 
them, was negligent with respect to their accounts, and committed securities violations. (R. 288-
302) The primary basis for the plaintiffs' allegations against Private Ledger arose from the fact 
that Defendant Harry was an agent for Private Ledger and that Private Ledger bestowed authority 
on Harry. Because plaintiffs were harmed by Harry's actions undertaken pursuant to the apparent 
authority bestowed upon him by Private Ledger, plaintiffs argued that Private Ledger was liable 
for Harry's actions. (R. 288-302) 
After the deadline set by the trial court for filing pretrial motions had expired, Defendant 
Private Ledger filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. 405-07) In its motion for summary 
judgment, Private Ledger argued that the statute of limitations for plaintiffs' claims had expired 
1
 Defendant Harry is not a party to this appeal. Harry was subsequently convicted of 
criminal charges arising from his actions in this case. State v. Harry. 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). Thereafter, Harry filed for bankruptcy (R. 395) which was twice dismissed. Harry 
has agreed to be bound by the ruling of the appellate court pursuant to an agreement between 
appellants and Harry and order of the court. (R. 834-836) 
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and that Private Ledger was not liable for Defendant Harry's actions because Harry was acting 
outside of Private Ledger's control and the scope of his authority at the time he committed the 
acts which were the subject of this action. (R.408-561) In response, plaintiffs argued that 
disputed issues of fact concerning when plaintiffs discovered Harry's misconduct foreclosed 
application of the statute of limitations. Furthermore, plaintiffs asserted that Private Ledger was 
liable for Harry's actions because he was acting as an agent for his principal, Private Ledger, and 
was acting under the apparent authority granted to him by Private Ledger. (R. 580-621) 
Following a hearing on Private Ledger's motion for summary judgment (R. 676), the trial 
court denied that portion of the motion related to the statute of limitations but granted the motion 
with respect to the issue of Private Ledger's liability for its agent's actions. (R. 666, 820-22) 
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion and memorandum for reconsideration or, in the alternative, 
for a new trial. (R. 682 - 701) Plaintiffs argued that the trial court's ruling was contrary to 
existing law because it ignored the doctrine of apparent authority. Additionally, plaintiffs asserted 
that disputed issues of material fact remained which precluded summary judgment in the case. 
(R. 682-701) After receiving memoranda the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration and affirmed its previous ruling which held that Private Ledger was not liable as 
a matter of law for the acts or omissions of Defendant Harry. (R. 820-25) Two separate orders, 
one granting Private Ledger's motion for summary judgment and the other denying plaintiffs' 
motion for reconsideration were signed by the trial court on November 21, 1994. (R. 821-22, 
823-24) (Addendum A) 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to certify the court's orders as final and appealable. (R. 804-06) However, counsel 
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for plaintiffs and Defendant Harry stipulated to a dismissal of the action against Defendant Harry. 
This stipulation, which rendered the Rule 54(b) motion moot, was reduced to an order dismissing 
Defendant Harry which was signed by the trial court on December 20, 1994. (R. 834-36) 
Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs filed a notice of appeal on December 20, 1994. 
FACTS 
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs/Appellants, the losing parties on summary 
judgment, as required by the standard of review, K&T, Inc.. 888 P.2d at 624, the following facts 
are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. 
Defendant Ronald Allen Harry ("Harry") was a registered agent and branch manager of 
Defendant Private Ledger's Salt Lake City branch office from January 1988 until November 
1989. Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs had utilized Harry's services at his prior brokerage firm, 
Prudential Bache, and used his services at Private Ledger. (R. 493, 499-500) Brgoch and Isaacs 
were retired airline pilots, had been long-time friends and had many similar interests. (R. 494, 
500) Harry managed their retirement portfolios while he worked as the branch manager at the 
Salt Lake City office of Private Ledger. (R. 600, 605) Harry's business cards, stationery, and 
title at the office held Harry out as the branch manager of Private Ledger in Salt Lake City. (R. 
602, 607) 
Despite instructions from Brgoch and Isaacs that none of their funds should be invested 
in high-risk or partnership investments, in May of 1988, Harry invested portions of Brgoch's and 
Isaacs's portfolios in an Arizona partnership which purchased unimproved real property in 
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Arizona for potential development.2 (R. 436, 453, 600-02, 605-07) Harry, without the 
knowledge or permission of either Brgoch or Isaacs, caused substantial amounts of their IRA 
funds to be transferred from their Private Ledger account to a bank in Onaga, Kansas. (R. 600, 
605) This transfer was effectuated only because Harry forged the plaintiffs' signatures on transfer 
documents. (R. 601-02, 606-07) Brgoch and Isaacs, not sophisticated or knowledgeable investors 
by any definition, were not provided with a prospectus or an explanation of the investment and 
were only told that the investment was short term, low risk, and provided suitable returns. (R. 
600-01, 605-06) Brgoch and Isaacs were given this information only after Harry had made the 
investment and transferred the funds. Brgoch and Isaacs did not find out about the forged 
documents until sometime later. (R. 601-02, 606-07) Brgoch and Isaacs were told that the 
investment was a one-time-only investment which would require no further investment on their 
part. (R. 600, 605) In actuality, the investment required annual assessments of $17,000 to be 
contributed by each investor over a period of up to thirteen years. When notice of the first 
assessments arrived, Brgoch and Isaacs complained to Harry. Harry told Brgoch and Isaacs to 
ignore the assessment, that a mistake had been made and that he would take care of the matter. 
(R. 601, 606) 
Harry was later charged with various criminal securities violations and was convicted of 
four counts of securities fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 and -21 (1989), and his 
conviction was subsequently affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals in April, 1994. State v. 
2
 The limited partnership which Harry invested plaintiffs' money in, Red River Mountain 
Limited Partnership ("Red River"), was not approved by Private Ledger. According to Private 
Ledger, agents were not permitted to sell any securities which had not been approved by Private 
Ledger, unless the agent received permission. An agent's sale of unapproved securities is referred 
to as "selling away." State v. Harry. 873 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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Harry, 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The first three counts pertained to criminal conduct 
perpetrated by Harry against three individual investors, including plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs. 
873 P.2d at 1155. The fourth count on which Harry was convicted alleged that Harry had 
committed fraud against Private Ledger. 873 P.2d at 1156. On appeal, Harry challenged this 
count but the conviction was affirmed by this Court which held that Private Ledger had suffered 
harm at Harry's hands because it did not receive commissions that would ordinarily be due it and 
because Private Ledger would be exposed "to potential lawsuits from disgruntled investors" due 
to Harry's actions. 873 P.2d at 1157. Brgoch and Isaacs, the plaintiffs in this case, are two of 
the three "disgruntled investors" to which Private Ledger is exposed to lawsuits as a result of 
Harry's actions. 
In its motion for summary judgment, Private Ledger argued that Harry was prevented by 
an agreement with Private Ledger from selling the kind of investments which he sold to Brgoch 
and Isaacs. Private Ledger claimed that Harry did not have authority to invest clients' funds in 
Red River. (R. 415) Harry claimed that he had authority to invest Brgoch's and Isaac's funds 
subject to his own discretion. (R. 304) Furthermore, another broker in the Salt Lake City office, 
Cregg Cannon, provided an affidavit which stated that Cannon had raised the issue of selling 
outside limited partnerships to officials of Private Ledger on at least one occasion and that he was 
led to believe that Private Ledger, while not officially sanctioning the conduct, would "look the 
other way" when such conduct occurred. (R. 618-19) (Addendum B) Cannon specifically stated, 
"My impression was that they [Private Ledger] didn't care about such action and that the action 
went on from various representatives and that if, in fact, I sold private securities they didn't want 
to know or be informed about those sales." (R. 619) Cannon also stated that Private Ledger's 
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supervision over its agents and offices was nonexistent. (R. 619) Such nonexistent supervision 
facilitated Private Ledger's position of not wanting to know the actions of its agents/managers. 
In response to the motion for summary judgment, Brgoch and Isaacs argued that they 
believed that Harry was acting on behalf of Private Ledger and under the authority granted to him 
by Private Ledger. Both Brgoch and Isaacs provided affidavits that stated that Harry held himself 
out as manager of the Salt Lake office and that their dealings with Harry occurred at the Salt 
Lake offices of Private Ledger. (R. 601, 602, 606, 607) (Addendum C) Furthermore, Brgoch 
and Isaacs each received statements from Private Ledger noting that funds had been transferred 
from their account. Finally, both Brgoch and Isaacs affirmatively stated that they were never told 
that Harry was acting as any type of independent contractor and that they were only told and 
informed by Harry's business cards, letterhead, and office notations that Harry was the manager 
of the Private Ledger Salt Lake City Branch. (R. 602, 607) Therefore, Brgoch and Isaacs argued 
that Harry had apparent authority to make all of the investments which were made from funds 
in their accounts. (R. 595-96, 686-93) 
In ruling on Private Ledger's motion for summary judgment, the trial court, upon being 
informed that Harry's criminal conviction had been affirmed, ruled that "The fact that Mr. Harry 
was criminally convicted of defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes my opinion in that one cannot 
be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent. 
They are mutually exclusive actions and terms." (R. 684, 848) Therefore, the trial court ruled 
that Private Ledger was not liable for Defendant Harry's actions. After plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration was denied without hearing and reduced to an order on November 21, 1994, (R. 
820-25) (Addendum A), the plaintiffs appealed. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Frank Brgoch and Seymour Isaacs contend that the trial court ignored 
the concept of apparent authority when it granted Defendant Private Ledger's motion for 
summary judgment. The case law on apparent authority demonstrates that Private Ledger should 
be held liable for the acts of its agent, Defendant Ron Harry. Harry appeared to have authority 
granted by Private Ledger to sell the Red River Limited Partnership to plaintiffs. The cases, 
including a 1995 case from this Court, clearly hold that a principal is liable for the acts of an 
agent even when the acts are forbidden by the principal and are detrimental to the principal under 
conditions like those present in this case. 
Additionally, plaintiffs contend that disputed issues of material fact concerning the 
authority granted to Harry by Private Ledger remained and should have precluded summary 
judgment. Evidence before the trial court indicated that Private Ledger may have chosen to 
consciously ignore the practice of selling away by its agents. This issue would affect Harry's 
authority and was not resolved by the trial court. Therefore, summary judgment should not have 
been granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT PRIVATE LEDGER IS 
NOT LIABLE IS CONTRARY TO EXISTING LAW BECAUSE 
IT IGNORES THE DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY. 
In its ruling in favor of Private Ledger, the trial court erroneously focused on the actions 
of Defendant Harry with respect to Private Ledger rather than on the authority apparent to 
plaintiffs which Private Ledger had bestowed upon Harry, its agent. In addition, the trial court 
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misinterpreted the law when it relied on the fact that Private Ledger had also been a victim of 
Defendant Harry. Finally, a case issued by this Court after the notice of appeal was filed in this 
case is indistinguishable from this case and dictates that the trial court must be reversed. 
In ruling in favor of Private Ledger, the trial court stated: 
The question I have is just how far can that be reached 
when the defendant in this matter, Private Ledger, has gone to what 
I think is more than sufficient steps to insure that activities by the 
registered agent are pursuant to their policies. 
. . . In essence, it appears that when a registered 
representative of a brokerage firm clearly violates the firm's 
policies and engages in unauthorized activities without the 
knowledge of Private Ledger in this matter, I just cannot see how 
liability can be imposed upon the principal, Private Ledger, in this 
matter. 
The fact that Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of 
defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes my opinion in that one 
cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in 
conduct which is criminally fraudulent. They are mutually 
exclusive actions and terms. 
(R. 847-48) This reasoning was also incorporated into the trial court's written order which stated: 
"The fact Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes the 
Court's opinion in that one cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in 
conduct which is criminally fraudulent as to Private Ledger. They are mutually exclusive actions 
and terms." (R. 821) The trial court's focus was totally misplaced, is contrary to the weight of 
authority and simply ignores the doctrine of apparent authority. 
The trial court's ruling totally discounted the concept of apparent authority. An agency 
relationship arises when one party, the principal, demonstrates an intention that another party, the 
agent, shall act on his behalf. The statements or actions of the agent can bind the principal. 
United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d 927, 931 (7th Cir. 1990). The principal can invest an agent 
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with at least two types of authority. "Actual" authority is "that authority the agent reasonably 
thinks she possesses based on the principal's dealings with her." Select Creations, Inc. v. 
Paliafito America, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1223, 1233 (E.D. Wis. 1993). If an agent lacks actual 
authority to perform specific actions, the agent's actions may still bind the principal, if the agent 
has apparent authority. "Apparent" authority "arises when the agent does not possess actual or 
implied authority to act for the principal in the matter, but the principal has clothed the agent 
with apparent authority to act for the principal in that particular act. In other words, the principal 
permits the agent to appear to have the authority to bind the principal." Badger v. Paulson Inv. 
Co., 803 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Or. 1991). Utah has long recognized the concept of apparent 
authority. See, e ^ , Santi v. Denver & Rio Grande Western RR Co., 442 P.2d 921, 923 n.3 
(Utah 1968) ("[Principals are generally bound by the acts of their agents which fall within the 
apparent scope of their authority and will be bound where innocent third parties have dealt with 
the agent in good faith."); Harrison v. Auto Securities Co., 257 P. 677 (Utah 1927). The trial 
court ignored these fundamental concepts of agency law and the decisions which interpret them 
when it ruled in favor of Private Ledger. 
The most relevant recent case from this Court on this issue is Horrocks v. Westfalia 
Svstemat, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Horrocks, which was not available to the trial court 
at the time of its ruling, is indistinguishable from this case. In Horrocks, plaintiff Garold 
Horrocks was a dairy farmer in Wayne County, Utah. Westfalia was an Illinois company which 
sold dairy equipment and Wayne Buchanan was a dealer who had represented Westfalia in Utah 
for a number of years. Buchanan, acting as an agent for Westfalia, entered into a contract for 
the purchase and sale of several thousand dollars worth of milking equipment. Horrocks made 
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only partial payment for the equipment but received only part of the equipment. 892 P.2d at 15. 
A few months after the contracts had been signed, Buchanan, the agent, presented Horrocks with 
a receipt and acknowledgement which stated that Horrocks had in fact received all of the 
equipment which had been ordered. Horrocks signed the acknowledgment and receipt without 
reading it. However, at the time, both Horrocks and Buchanan knew that the balance of the 
equipment had not been delivered. Subsequently, Buchanan presented the acknowledgment to 
Westfalia who in turn paid Buchanan $14,000.00. 892 P.2d at 15. Unbeknownst to Horrocks 
and Westfalia, Buchanan then left the area apparently "making off with the undelivered 
equipment and cash." Id. After a few months when the balance of the equipment had not been 
delivered, Horrocks telephoned Westfalia and complained. This Court noted that this telephone 
call from Horrocks was the first knowledge that Westfalia had that the acknowledgement 
presented to it by Buchanan was false. Shortly thereafter, Horrocks filed suit against Westfalia 
alleging breach of contract, and Westfalia counterclaimed for the entire amount owed under the 
contract. 
This Court stated that the central issue in Horrocks was whether "Westfalia should bear 
the responsibility for the unauthorized, adverse acts of its agent." 892 P.2d at 15. In the case, 
Westfalia made the argument that Buchanan, Westfalia's agent, was acting outside the scope of 
his authority, was acting in his own self-interest, and that his actions were adverse to Westfalia. 
Id. This is exactly the argument that Private Ledger makes with respect to its agent, Defendant 
Harry. 
In Horrocks, this Court soundly rejected Westfalia's argument. The court stated that basic 
agency law requires that a principal be bound by the acts of an agent clothed with apparent 
12 
authority. 892 P.2d at 15. The court stated that even when an agent's acts adversely impact its 
principal, the principal is still liable for the agent's actions as against an unknowing and innocent 
third party.3 Specifically, the court stated: 
The loss that results from Buchanan's misconduct must be borne by 
the party who empowered Buchanan to commit the wrong. "Where 
a loss is to be suffered through the misconduct of an agent, it 
should be borne by those who put it in his power to do the wrong." 
County of Macon v. Shores. 397 U.S. 272, 279, 24 L.Ed. 889, 890 
(1877); see also Vickers, 607 P.2d at 607; Harrison. 257 P. at 679-
80. Westfalia placed Buchanan in the position to perpetrate a 
fraud. Consequently, Westfalia must bear the responsibility for 
Buchanan's misconduct. The trial court did not err by placing 
liability on Westfalia under the theory of apparent authority. 
. . . Even when the agent is acting adversely to the 
principal's interest, the knowledge of the agent may still be 
imputed to the principal. . . . Under either subsection [of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency], Buchanan's actions may be 
imputed to Westfalia. 
892 P.2d at 16-17. This Court has clearly adopted the position, supported by abundant authority, 
that a principal who cloaks an agent with apparent authority must suffer the loss due to an agent's 
misconduct even when the agent's misconduct has harmed the principal itself. 
This general principle of agency law, that a principal is bound by the acts of its agent as 
against innocent third parties, was recognized long ago by the Utah Supreme Court. In Harrison 
v. Auto Securities Co.. 257 P. 677 (Utah 1927), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is a general principle of the law of agency, running through all 
contracts made by agents with third parties, that the principals are 
bound by the acts of their agents which fall within the apparent 
scope of authority of the agents, and that the principals will not be 
permitted to deny the authority of their agents against innocent 
third parties, who have dealt with those agents in good faith. 
257 P. at 679. 
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In Horrocks, this Court analyzed the facts which led the plaintiff in that case to believe 
that Buchanan was acting within his authority when he committed the ultimately fraudulent 
actions. 892 P.2d at 16. In this case also, the facts are abundantly clear that the plaintiffs 
perceived Defendant Harry to be cloaked with the apparent authority by Private Ledger to invest 
their money in Red River. To the plaintiffs, whose point of view should have been assumed by 
the trial court but was not, Defendant Harry had apparent authority derived from his managerial 
position with Private Ledger to deal in the securities at issue. Brgoch and Isaacs only ever dealt 
with Harry at the Private Ledger office in Salt Lake City. When they needed to contact Harry, 
they contacted him at the Private Ledger office. Harry's business cards and letterhead announced 
Harry as manager for the Private Ledger office in Salt Lake City. (R. 602, 607) Furthermore, 
Brgoch and Isaacs were never informed that Harry was acting on his own behalf or even that he 
could have acted on his own behalf. (R. 602, 607) For all appearances to Brgoch and Isaacs, 
Harry acted only on behalf of Private Ledger and under its control and authority. 
The trial court's concerns that Private Ledger had also been a victim of Harry's fraudulent 
activities and that Private Ledger attempted to control Harry are clearly contrary to Horrocks and 
cases from other courts as well as other authorities. Indeed, there is ample support for the 
proposition that misconduct by the agent against innocent third parties will bind the principal 
even if the principal does not benefit or is harmed itself by the agent's misconduct and even if 
the conduct is specifically forbidden by the principal. 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency §161 (1958), plainly states that a principal can be 
responsible for the acts of an agent even where the acts are forbidden by the principal. The 
Restatement provides: 
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A general agent for a disclosed or partially disclosed principal 
subjects his principal to liability for acts done on his account which 
usually accompany or are incidental to transactions which the agent 
is authorized to conduct if, although they are forbidden by the 
principal, the other party reasonably believes that the agent is 
authorized to do them and has no notice that he is not so 
authorized. 
Courts have applied this provision to situations identical to the one in this case to find a 
brokerage firm liable. 
For example, in Hollowav v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 696 (6th Cir. 1976), the Sixth 
Circuit cited section 161 of the Restatement as a basis for imposing liability on a brokerage firm 
when its agent, acting on his own volition, sold unregistered stock, a situation identical to this 
case. The court held, inter alia, that those purchasers of the unregistered stock "who knew of [the 
agent's] status with [the brokerage firm] and who were without knowledge that he was acting 
separately from [the brokerage firm] were permitted to recover [from the brokerage firm]." 536 
F.2d at 696. In explaining the basis for its holding the court stated: 
The liability of [the brokerage firm] is premised on the theory that 
"if one appoints an agent to conduct a series of transactions over a 
period of time, it is fair that he should bear losses which are 
incurred when such an agent, although without authority to do so, 
does something which is usually done in connection with the 
transactions he is employed to conduct." 
There was no proof that [the brokerage firm] "usually" 
engaged in the sale of unregistered stock. 
[The brokerage firm], however, had an affirmative 
obligation to prevent the use of the prestige of its firm to defraud 
the investing public. When its agents are dealing individually in 
the sale of securities [the brokerage firm] must be clearly 
disassociated from those transactions, as otherwise it will incur 
liability on the basis of respondeat superior for the fraudulent 
representations of its agents. 
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536 F.2d at 696, citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §161, Comment a (1958). 
The situation described by §161 and covered in Hollowav is precisely what occurred here. 
Harry was a general agent for Private Ledger.4 Private Ledger was a disclosed principal. Harry's 
act of "selling" Red River was an act which would appear to Brgoch and Isaacs to be in the 
normal course of business which Harry appeared to be authorized to perform by Private Ledger. 
Therefore, even if the selling of Red River was forbidden by Private Ledger, it would 
nevertheless be liable under §161 of the Restatement and the reasoning of Hollowav. 
In Kerbs v. Fall River Industries, Inc.. 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974), a securities fraud 
case originating in Utah, the 10th Circuit stated: 
Finally, defendant Fall River Industries argues that even if 
Thompson, its president, is liable for fraud and deceit, there is no 
basis on which to impute that fraud and deceit to the corporation, 
because plaintiff made no showing that Thompson was acting 
within the scope of his corporate authority or employment. The 
general rule that a principal is liable for the fraud and 
misrepresentations of his agent while acting within the scope of his 
authority is fully applicable to corporations, even though the 
corporation did not authorize the fraud ,or could not even be 
deemed to know of the fraud. See 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit, 
§ 321; 19 C.J.S. Corporations. § 1278. The Restatement of 
Agency, Second (1958), at § 261, states the applicable principle as 
follows: 
A principal who puts a servant or other agent in a 
position which enables the agent, while apparently 
acting within his authority, to commit a fraud upon 
third persons is subject to liability to such third 
persons for the fraud. 
4
 The Restatement defines a "general agent" as an "agent authorized to conduct a series of 
transactions involving continuity of service." Restatement (Second) of Agency §3(1) (1958). By 
conducting routine business for Private Ledger out of its Salt Lake City office on a daily basis, 
Harry was clearly a general agent. 
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And § 262 of the Restatement provides: 
A person who otherwise would be liable to another 
for the misrepresentation of one apparently acting 
for him is not relieved from liability by the fact that 
the servant or other agent acts entirely for his own 
purposes, unless the other has notice of this. 
We have found no Utah case law directly in point, but we are 
convinced that the Utah courts would not differ from these 
articulated principles of agency law. 
Fall River Industries made Thompson, its principal officer, 
placing him in the position to speak for and on behalf of the 
corporation. . . . We hold that Fall River Industries is liable to 
plaintiff because Thompson, its president, acting within the scope 
of his apparent authority as principal officer and agent of the 
corporation, engaged in conduct which violated the provisions of 
§ 10 of the Act and Rule 10b-5. 
502 F.2d at 740-41.5 
The fact that an agent's principal has been a victim in the agent's scheme to defraud a 
third party is of no legal consequence in determining the liability of the principal. This notion 
was set forth by Judge Learned Hand in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F.2d 757 (2nd Cir. 
1946). Speaking for the court in Ricketts, Judge Hand stated: 
Although the law was at one time otherwise, at least in this 
country, it is now settled both in the federal system and in England, 
that an agent does not cease to be acting within the scope of his 
authority when he is engaged in a fraud upon a third person. That 
has probably always been the more generally accepted doctrine. 
We can see no distinction in principle between that situation and 
one in which the agent deceives, not the third person, but his 
5
 More recently, the Utah Federal District Court in Castle Glen, Inc. v. Commonwealth 
Savings Assn., 689 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Utah 1988), stated that federal securities laws do not 
displace the common law remedies of respondeat superior and vicarious liability of the principals 
for the fraudulent actions of their agents. 689 F. Supp. at 1072-73. The district court in Castle 
Glen cited Kerbs in support. 
17 
principal The reason in each case for holding the principal 
[liable] is that the third person has no means of knowing that the 
agent is acting beyond his authority, and it is a matter of entire 
indifference whether the agent acts adds deception of his principal 
to deception of a third person; for it is obviously true that for the 
agent consciously to exceed his powers is to deceive the third 
person. 
153 F.2d at 759 (citations omitted, emphasis added). In other words, the law must act to protect 
the interests of innocent third persons against an agent's fraudulent activities before the interests 
of the principal are protected. 
This concept has been held to mean that if a principal must be held liable because of the 
unknown, fraudulent activities of an agent, then the courts have held that the principal should 
suffer the consequences in such cases rather than placing the burden on innocent third parties. 
For example, in Herweck's Paint and Wallpaper Co. v. C. I. T. Corp., 123 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 
1941), the plaintiff brought an action to recover against the defendant for the fraudulent action 
of the defendant's agent. The defendants in Herweck's, as the defendants here, asserted that the 
agent was acting for himself and that they were wholly ignorant of any fraud or wrongdoing. 
123 F.2d at 990. In holding that this defense failed, the court in Herweck's stated: 
In these circumstances where one of two innocent persons must 
suffer, the law, upon the plainest principles and without wavering, 
puts the burden not upon the innocent third party, with whom the 
agent dealt for his principal, but upon the principal who has clothed 
him with authority to deal, and who has obtained and kept the 
fruits of his dealing. 
123 F.2d at 990. Several jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g.. Badger v. 
Paulson Inv. Co., 803 P.2d 1178 (Or. 1991); Young v. Nevada Title Co., 744 P.2d 902, 903 
(Nev. 1987) ("The principal may be bound by acts of its agents as to third parties who have no 
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reason to know of the agent's improper conduct. This is so even when the agent acts for his own 
motive and without benefit to his principal.") 
Indeed, the principle is so common that it has found its way into the legal encyclopedias. 
For example, in 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit § 321, 424 (1968), the commentary states: 
The general rule that a principal is liable for the fraud and 
misrepresentation of its agent while acting within the scope of his 
employment or authority is fully applicable to corporations. The 
corporation may be held liable for the fraud and deceit of its 
officers and agents acting within the scope of their corporate 
authority or employment, even though the wrongful act was ultra 
vires or in fraud of the corporation itself and notwithstanding that 
the corporation did not authorize, or concur in, or could not even 
be deemed to know of the fraud. 
(Footnotes and citations omitted). 
In short, the fact that Private Ledger may have been a victim of Defendant Harry's 
criminal activity is not a defense in a civil action which will relieve Private Ledger of liability. 
Indeed, the Utah Court of Appeals in its opinion in Harry's case stated as much. The court of 
appeals stated that Private Ledger was a victim because Harry's actions exposed Private Ledger 
to "potential lawsuits from the disgruntled investors." State v. Harry. 873 P.2d at 1157. The trial 
court's ruling in this case is contrary to this holding. In essence, the trial court stated that 
because of Harry's criminal activities, Private Ledger should not be exposed to liability from its 
investors. Additionally, the trial court's statement that Private Ledger had "gone to . . . more 
than sufficient steps to insure that the activities by the registered agent are pursuant to their 
policies" did not consider that some principals will be held to a higher standard of accountability 
for the actions of their agents. A brokerage house, such as Private Ledger, is a principal which 
courts have held to a higher standard of accountability. In Sharp v. Coopers & Lvbrand, 649 
19 
F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982), the Third Circuit analyzed cases from 
other circuits which held brokerage houses to a heightened standard. In analyzing the reasoning 
which supports such a heightened standard and the results which flow from it, the court stated: 
The implicit reasoning in [such cases] that brokers have a higher 
public duty under the securities laws than do other persons leads to 
imposition of a duty to exercise a high standard of supervision. 
This duty is enforceable through imposition of secondary liability 
based on respondeat superior. 
. . . Such firms should be held accountable if employees 
they select utilize the firm's prestige to practice fraud upon the 
investing public. 
. . . Protection of investors is, after all, the primary purpose 
of the securities laws. 
649 F.2d at 182, 182 n.l 1, 184 (citations omitted). See also Henrickson v. Henrickson, 640 F.2d 
880, 887 (7th Cir. 1981); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111,1118-
19 (5th Cir. 1980); Hollowav v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1976). 
In Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito America, Inc., 830 F.Supp. 1223, 1235 (E.D. Wis. 
1993), the court stated the generally accepted proposition that a principal is liable for the tort of 
an agent "acting with apparent authority even if the principal derives no benefit from the agent's 
actions and the agent acts entirely for his own purposes." The court then cited comment a of 
section 261 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency to explain that such liability is based on the 
fact that the agent's position facilitates the commission of the fraud because to the innocent third 
party the agent appears to be acting in the ordinary course of business. Id. In other words, 
because of the position occupied by the agent, the innocent third party who has dealt with the 
agent in normal, nonfraudulent transactions is unable to discern the fraudulent transaction from 
the real transaction. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the principal to supervise activities of 
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the agent because the principal has placed the agent in the position to commit the fraud. This 
is the reasoning upon which this Court's decision in Horrocks is based. Unfortunately, such 
reasoning was not even considered by the trial court in this case. 
Furthermore, facts before the trial court belie that court's belief that Private Ledger 
attempted to exert control over Harry's activities. For example, evidence before the court 
indicated that Private Ledger was well aware of the "selling away" of many of its agents but did 
nothing to control the practice other than to require agents to sign a document stating that they 
would not participate in the practice. However, as evidence before the court indicated, the 
practice of "selling away" was common and wide spread among the agents of Private Ledger. 
(R. 618-19) In fact, Private Ledger may have even given its agents implied authority to deal 
away because it failed in the face of evidence of "selling away" to stop the practice. Private 
Ledger's response to "selling away" was to "turn a blind eye to the practice." (R. 619) Brgoch 
and Isaacs had every reason to believe that Defendant Harry was cloaked with the mantle of 
authority of Private Ledger to sell the securities which he dealt to them. Therefore, under the 
concept of apparent authority, Private Ledger should have been held liable for Harry's actions. 
In its motion for summary judgment, Private Ledger cited a number of federal cases which 
it stated supported its position concerning the control asserted by Private Ledger over Defendant 
Harry. However, an examination of those cases reveals that they simply do not apply here. For 
example, in its memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, Private 
Ledger cited Hauser v. Farrell 14 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 1994), a case which Private Ledger states 
"supports the trial court's ruling." However, Private Ledger failed to disclose to the trial court 
a significant fact in Hauser which distinguishes it from this case. Specifically, in Hauser, the 
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plaintiff investors "did not, in deposition excerpts provided to the court, contradict the brokers' 
representations that they told the customers that the [investment] would not be through [the 
brokerage firm]." 14 F.3d at 1343. In other words, unlike this case where Defendant Harry 
never informed Brgoch and Isaacs that the investment was not sanctioned by Private Ledger, the 
plaintiffs in Hauser were specifically informed that the defendant brokerage firm did not sanction 
the investment at issue in that case. Other cases cited by Private Ledger are equally 
distinguishable and simply have no application to this case. 
Decisions from this jurisdiction require that the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
be reversed because it incorrectly applied the law. 
POINT II 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING 
APPARENT AUTHORITY PRECLUDED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE. 
Summary judgment may not be granted if disputed issues of material fact remain to be 
resolved in the trial court. In this case, such issues existed and were presented to the trial court 
and therefore summary judgment should not have been granted. Those issues of disputed fact 
concern Private Ledger's assertions that it attempted to control the actions of its agents. Private 
Ledger presented a document signed by Defendant Harry, executed before his employment with 
Private Ledger, in which Harry purported to renounce the practice of "selling away." However, 
evidence produced by the plaintiffs' various affidavits and depositions provided to the court 
clearly indicated that Private Ledger was aware of the practice of "selling away" by its agents and 
did little to control the practice. (R. 618-19; Addendum B) The fact that Private Ledger 
requested its agents to renounce the practice of "selling away" substantiates its knowledge of the 
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problem. Some testimony even indicated that Private Ledger, even though aware of the problem, 
turned its back on the problem and chose instead to ignore the actions of its agents. (R. 619) 
This fact alone raises an issue of material fact concerning the extent of Harry's authority which 
was not resolved by the trial court. The extent of an agent's authority is a material question of 
fact which must he determined by the trier of fact Diversified Development & Investment Inc. 
v. HeiL 889 P.2d 1212, 1221 (N.M. 1995). 
Because unresolved material facts remained, the trial court should not have granted Private 
Ledger's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment in this case was simply precluded 
by the existence of this dispute on the facts as to whether or not Private Ledger did everything 
it could do to prevent the damages sustained by appellants because of the acts of Private Ledger's 
agent, Ron Harry, and the authority which Harry therefore had been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief, plaintiffs request that this Court reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand this case for trial. 
DATED this 10th day of July, 1995. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
RANDY B. COKE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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STRONG & HANNI 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
PRIVATE LEDGER FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., 
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., and 
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORATION 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK BRGOCH and SEYMOUR ] 
ISAACS, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RONALD ALLEN HARRY, an 
individual; PRIVATE LEDGER 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; ] 
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,] 
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORA- ] 
TION; and DOES 1 to 10, 
Defendants. 
i ORDER 
i Civil No. C92-1463 
i Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The motion of Defendants, Private Ledger Financial Services, 
Inc., Linsco Financial Services, Inc. and Linsco/Private Ledger 
Corporation for summary judgment, having come before the above-
entitled Court, the Honorable Glenn Iwasaki, District Court Judge, 
MM-
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presiding and Plaintiffs Frank Brgoch and Seymour Isaacs 
represented by Randy B. Coke of Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, 
Defendants-movants being represented by S. Baird Morgan of Strong 
& Hanni and Michael L. Kirby of Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, and 
attorney John Michael Coombs being present on behalf of Defendant, 
Ronald Allen Harry and the Court having received and reviewed the 
memoranda, affidavits and other document of record and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters its Order as 
follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that the motion of 
Defendants, Private Ledger Financial Services Inc., Linsco 
Financial Services, Inc., and Linsco/Private Ledger Corporation, 
based on the statute of limitations, is denied on the grounds that 
the Court finds a question of fact to exist as to possible 
concealment of Plaintiff's claims by Defendant, Ronald Harry. The 
motion of said Defendants for summary judgment on the grounds that 
said Defendants are not liable, as a matter of law, for the acts or 
omissions of Defendant Ronald Allen Harry is granted, dismissing 
with prejudice and on the merits all claims of Plaintiffs against 
Defendants. The fact Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of 
defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes the Court's opinion in that 
one cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging 
in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as to Private Ledger. 
They are mutually exclusive actions and terms. The Court further 
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finds pursuant to its ruling of May 17, 1994, the transcript of 
which is incorporated herein. 
day of DATED this , 1994. 
BY THE 
Glenn K. Iwasaki, District Judge 
APPROVAL 
Randy B. Coke 
Attor/ey for PlaCn 
Jofflh Michael Coor 
Atwomey for Defendant Ronald 
Tllen Harry 
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first-class postage prepaid to: 
J. Michael Coombs 
72 East 400 South #220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Randy B. Coke 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
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S. Baird Morgan, Esq. (Utah Bar No. 2314) 
STRONG & HANNI 
6th Floor, Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 532-7080 
Michael L. Kirby, Esq. (Cal. Bar No. 050895) 
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1100 
San Diego, California 92101-3355 
(619) 231-8666 
Attorneys for Defendants 
PRIVATE LEDGER FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., 
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., and 
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORATION 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK BRGOCH and SEYMOUR ] 
ISAACS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RONALD ALLEN HARRY, an 
individual; PRIVATE LEDGER 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; 
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,] 
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORA- ; 
TION; and DOES 1 to 10, ; 
Defendants. ] 
i ORDER 
i Civil No. C92-1463 
) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The Motion for Reconsideration Or, In the Alternative, Motion 
For a New Trial of plaintiffs having come before the above-entitled 
Court, the Honorable Glenn Iwasaki, District Court Judge, and the 
Court having received and reviewed supporting and opposing 
""721 x 
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memoranda and being familiar with the bases for the previously-
granted Motion for Summary Judgment and being otherwise fully 
advised in the premises now enters its order as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs' 
Motlton for Reconsideration Or, In the Alternative, Motion for a New 
Trial be and is hereby defied. c* 
DATED this day of 1994. 
BY THE CO 
Glenn K. Iwasaki, District Judge 
APPROyAli 
/f^ andy B. Cok« 
/Attorney tow P l a l n t i 
yohn Michael Coomb* bs 
Attorney for Defendant Ronald 
J
 Allen Harry 
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Randy B. Coke 
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RANDY B, COKE, ESQ., Bar No. 3925 
NYGAARD, COKE « VINCENT 
Attorneys for Pteintlffi 
317 North 900 West Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone No. 801-328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SAW LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK BRGOCH and SEYMOUR 
ISAACS, 
FlaSntlffis, 
VI* 
RONALD ALLEN HARRY, an 
individual; PRIVATE LEDGER t 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC, 
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, t 
INC., LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER 
CORPORATION; and DOES 1 TO 10 s 
Defendants i 
AFFIDAVIT OF CREGG CANNON 
Judge Glenn K. IwasaW 
OvllNo. C92-14o3 
) )SSi 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake ) 
GREGG CANNON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1 • That I am the same Cregg Cannon referred to in the Affidavit or Jonathan A, 
I 
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Boynton filed In this matter and dated the 29th day of March, 1994. 
2 . That I was In fact a registered representative of Private Ledger representing 
Private Ledger In Salt Lake Cfty> Utah, commencing on or about November 1987. 
3 . That Ron Harry, one of the named defendants herein, and I left our prior 
brokerage house (Prudential Bache) on or about November of 1987 to go with Private 
ledger to start their new Salt Lake Branch Office and be co-managers of the same. 
4 . That I was made aware of Private Ledger and Its solicitation of new 
representatives through ads. In the "Registered Representative* magazine. 
5 . That my reason for leaving Prudential Bache and going to Private Ledger was 
their advertising and representations of more Independence, etc. 
6 . That early in my relationship with Private Ledger I, In feet, brought up the sale 
of "outside limited parmer5hlps', to my recruiter at Private Ledger on at least one occasion. 
7* That although 1 discussed the sale of outside limited partnerships with someone 
at Private Ledger I was led to beBeve that PHuate Ledger didn't want to hear about such 
information, and when I brought it up the subject would be hnmediateiy changed and other 
matters discussed. 
8 . That on a recruitment trip to Palm Springs provided by Private Ledger for the 
benefit of its representatives, I was told by other representatives that they seB and had sold 
outside Investments while representing Private Ledger. 
9 . That although I signed an agreement and memorandum acknowledging the 
I 
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prohibition against the solicitation and sell of private securities which were not approved by 
Private Ledger, my impression was that they didn't care about such action and that the action 
went on from various representatives and that If, in fact, I sold private securities they didn't 
want to know or be informed about those sales, 
10. That while woiWng with Private Ledger, although I remember someone once 
coming co the Sak Lake Office, I don't recall any hies being reviewed by any supervisors or 
other representatives of Private Ledger. 
11 . That iton't recall anyone from PrW3teLedg^ 
with any clients or customers, while working with Private Ledger. 
Further affiant sahh not 
DATED this ?2 day of April 1994. 
(U00&&-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
Notary PubBc 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
«M** 1 _ 'COKE 
333 Nor* 300 Wet t f 
Sek \Mm City, Utah 841031 
My Commission Expires I 
September 27,1994 I 
State of Utah J 
oooe ia 
R-Q5& 801 5 6 6 450'0 
TOTAL P.03 
0 4 - 2 2 - 9 4 0 3 : 2 3 P M P0Q3 it?Q 
ADDENDUM C 
RANDY B. COKE, ESQ., Bar No. 3925 
NYGAARD, COKE tt VINCENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
335 North 300 West Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone No. 801-328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK BRGOCH and SEYMOUR 
ISAACS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RONALD ALLEN HARRY, an 
individual; PRIVATE LEDGER : 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., 
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, : 
INC., LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER 
CORPORATION; and DOES 1 TO 10 : 
Defendants : 
AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK BRGOCH 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Civil No. C92-1463 
)SS: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
FRANK BRGOCH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1 
0 0 0 5 9 9 
1. That I am a named plaintiff in the above captioned matter, and have personal 
knowledge of all the matters contained in this Affidavit. 
2. That I am now aware that on or about May of 1988, defendant Ronald Allen 
Harry, while manager of Private Ledger at their Salt Lake City office, improperly invested 
$30,600 of my IRA retirement portfolio in a real estate limited partnership in Arizona called 
Red River Mountain Partnership. 
3. That on or about May or ]une of 1988 I received a statement from Private 
Ledger showing only that on 5/9/88 federal funds were sent to FNB Onaga in the amount 
of $30,600. 
4. That on or about July of 1988 I received a one page statement (Exhibit 5 to 
defendant Private Ledger's Memorandum) inferring I had an individual retirement account 
at a bank in Kansas and had purchased an asset called Red River Mountain Limited 
Partnership. 
5. That at the time I received that statement I had no idea what it was, and 
arranged a meeting with defendant Ronald Allen Harry, at which time he told me it was 
some type of real estate deal, was a good investment, a "one time draw", and although he 
said it was some type of a partnership, he told me that it would be a good short term 
investment and that, in fact, he had some of his own money in the investment. 
6. That I had numerous telephone discussions with defendant Harry regarding Red 
River Mountain Limited Partnership and he never would give me any details or responsive 
2 
0006OG 
answers concerning the true facts and circumstances, but told me he was taking care of it and 
that everything wa alright. 
7. That I had no contact regarding this investment from Private Ledger, the Bank 
of Onaga, or Red River Mountain, until on or about the end of March, 1989, when I 
received a letter calling for a $ 17,310.00 assessment 
8. That immediately upon receipt of that letter (Exhibit 8 to defendant Private 
Ledger's Memorandum) I contacted defendant Ronald Allen Harry at the offices of Private 
Ledger and was informed over and over that it was a mistake, "not to worry about it," that 
he was not paying his, and that he would take care of i t 
9. That upon receiving a similar letter in March of 1990,1 received the same type 
of responses from defendant Harry. 
10. That some time after March of 1990,1 was contacted by investigators for the 
Attorney General's Office for the State of Utah regarding defendant Ronald Allen Harry and 
investments made in Red River Mountain Limited Partnership. 
11. That on or about May of 1990, through the direction of the Attorney 
General's Office, I obtained copies of forged IRA transfer documents, limited partnership 
certificates, and other information held at the Bank of Onaga, which 1 had never seen nor 
had any idea that they existed until they were returned pursuant to subpoena. 
12. That it wasn't until after that time, with the explanation over the following 
months from the Attorney General's office and ultimately the trial of defendant Harry, that 
3 
000601 
1 learned precisely how Harry, without my permission or authority, had diverted funds from 
my IRA account held at Private Ledger to the First National Bank of Onaga to invest in a 
limited partnership which called for annual assessments of over $ 17,000 for a period of 
thirteen years. 
13. That I was never given or had explained to me the particulars of the offering, 
or given an offering memorandum. 
14. That the only reason I took my IRA account from Prudential Bache to Private 
Ledger Financial Services was that Ronald Allen Harry told me that he was the manager of 
the new Salt Lake Office, and that they were tied with Pershing, a division of Donaldson, 
Lufkin & jenrette Securities Corporation out of New York, and that they were well 
established and a powerful securities firm. 
15. That at no time while I had my entire IRA account with Private Ledger was I 
told that defendant Harry was an independent contractor and was only told and informed 
by his business cards, letters, etc., that he was a manager of Private Ledger out of their Salt 
Lake offices here in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Further affiant saith not. 
DATED this 22nd day of April, 1994. 
Frank Brgoch 
4 
0 0 0 6 0 2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)SS 
County of Salt Lake ) 
FRANK BRGOCH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is one of the 
plaintiffs in this action and the person who signed the above and foregoing instrument; that 
he has read the same, knows and understands the contents, and that it is true to the best of 
his knowledge, information and belief. 
Z7 
JJ/^.$/&AJ 
Brgocl Frank ifr h 
Subscribed and swom to before me this 22nd day of A 
My Commission Expires: 
COKE 
lOOWcst | 
SrttJfcft City. Utah 64 K J . My CWW*s»ton Extxrc; | 
StetecfUtih I 
J 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
0 0 0 6 0 3 
RANDY B. COKE, ESQ., Bar No. 3925 
NYGAARD, COKE tt VINCENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
333 North 300 West Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone No. 801-328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK BRGOCH and SEYMOUR 
ISAACS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RONALD ALLEN HARRY, an 
individual; PRIVATE LEDGER 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., 
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, 
INC., LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER 
CORPORATION; and DOES 1 TO 10 : 
Defendants : 
AFFIDAVIT OF SEYMOUR ISAACS 
judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Civil No. C92-1463 
)SS: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
SEYMOUR ISAACS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That I am a named plaintiff in the above captioned matter, and have personal 
1 
0 0 0 6 0 4 
knowledge of all the matters contained in this Affidavit. 
2. That I am now aware that on or about May of 1988, defendant Ronald Allen 
Harry, while manager of Private Ledger at their Salt Lake Qty office, improperly invested 
$31,000 of my IRA retirement portfolio in a real estate limited partnership in Arizona called 
Red River Mountain Partnership. 
3. That on or about May or June of 1988 I received a statement from Private 
Ledger showing only that on 5/9/88 federal funds were sent to FNB Onaga in the amount 
of $31,000. 
4. That on or about July of 1988 I received a one page statement from the First 
National Bank of Onaga (Exhibit 5 to defendant Private Ledger's Memorandum) inferring 
I had an individual retirement account at a bank in Kansas and had purchased an asset called 
Red River Mountain Limited Partnership. That it was my understanding that the cash was 
left deposited at the Bank of Onaga. 
5. That at the time I received that statement I had no idea what it was, and 
arranged a meeting with defendant Ronald Allen Harry, at which time he told me it was 
some type of real estate deal, was a good investment, a "one time drop", and although he 
said it was some type of a partnership, he told me that it would be a good short term 
investment and that, in fact, he had some of his own money in the investment. 
6. That 1 had numerous telephone discussions with defendant Harry regarding Red 
River Mountain Limited Partnership and he never would give me any details or responsive 
2 
000605 
answers concerning the true facts and circumstances but told me he was taking care of it and 
that everything was alright. 
7. That I had no contact regarding this investment from the Bank of Onaga or 
Red River Mountain until on or about the end of March, 1989, when I received a letter 
calling for a $ 17,310.00 assessment. 
8. That immediately upon receipt of that letter (Exhibit 8 to defendant Private 
Ledger's Memorandum) I contacted defendant Ronald Allen Harry at the offices of Private 
Ledger and was informed over and over that it was a mistake, "not to worry about it," that 
he was not paying his, and that he would take care of i t 
9. That upon receiving a similar letter in March of 1990,1 received the same type 
of responses from defendant Harry. 
10. That some time after March of 1990,1 was contacted by investigators for the 
Attorney General's Office for the State of Utah regarding defendant Ronald Allen Harry and 
investments made in Red River Mountain Limited Partnership. 
11. That on or about May of 1990, through the direction of the Attorney 
General's Office, I obtained copies of forged IRA transfer documents, limited partnership 
certificates, and other information held at the Bank of Onaga, which I had never seen nor 
had any idea that they existed until they were returned pursuant to subpoena. 
12. That it wasn't until about May of 1990, with the explanation over the 
following months from the Attorney General's office and ultimately the trial of defendant 
3 
0 0 0 6 0 6 
Harry, that I learned how Harry, without my permission or authority, had forged my 
signature and diverted fiinds from my IRA account held at Private Ledger to the First 
National Bank of Onaga to invest in a limited partnership which called for annual assessments 
of over $ 17,000 for a period of thirteen years. 
13. That I was never given or had explained to me the particulars of the offering, 
or given an offering memorandum. 
14. That the only reason I took my IRA account from Prudential Bache to Private 
Ledger Financial Services was that Ronald Allen Harry told me that he was the manager of 
the new Salt Lake Office, and that they were tied with Pershing, a division of Donaldson, 
Lufkin sc jenrette Securities Corporation out of New York, and that they were well 
established and a powerful securities firm. 
15. That at no time while I had my entire IRA account with Private Ledger was I 
told that defendant Harry was an independent contractor and was only told and informed 
by his business cards, letters, etc., that he was a manager of Private Ledger out of their Salt 
Lake offices here in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Further affiant saith not. 
DATED this 22nd day of April, 1994. 
7 Seymour Isaacs 
4 
0 0 0 6 0 * 
) SS: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
SEYMOUR ISAACS, being first duly swom, deposes and says: That he is one of the 
plaintiffs above named, and the person who signed the above and foregoing instrument; that 
he has read the same, knows and understands the contents, and that it is true to the best of 
his knowledge, information and belief. 
Seymour Isaacs 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22nd day of 
My Commission Expires: 
SaBI 
"TJdtary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
0 0 0 6 0 S 
